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Abstract. We hypothesized that individual grading in group work, a widespread practice, hampers information sharing in cooperative problem
solving. Experiment 1 showed that a condition in which members’ individual contribution was expected to be visible and graded, as in most
graded work, led to less pooling of relevant, unshared information and more pooling of less-relevant, shared information than two control
conditions where individual contribution was not graded, but either visible or not. Experiment 2 conceptually replicated this effect: Group
members primed with grades pooled less of their unshared information, but more of their shared information, compared to group members
primed with neutral concepts. Thus, grading can hinder cooperative work and impair information sharing in groups.
Keywords: information sharing, grades, hidden profiles, cooperation, mixed-motives
Can people genuinely cooperate when their performance is
assessed individually? This question epitomizes an interest-
ing, albeit problematic societal phenomenon whereby coop-
eration is promoted as a fruitful working structure in both
educational (e.g., Johnson & Johnson, 2009) and organiza-
tional settings (e.g., Wong, Tjosvold, & Liu, 2009), while at
the same time individual grades are by far the dominant
assessment tool used in these settings (Knight & Yorke,
2003). Indeed, students and workers are often required to
cooperate on common projects, tasks, assignments, and
exercises, while being individually assessed with grades.
Such practices, however, place students and workers in a
dilemmatic situation (De Cremer, Snyder, & Dewitte,
2001), one in which two demands are to be considered at
once: Acting in the interest of the group and cooperating,
on the one hand, and considering self-interest and compet-
ing for good grades, on the other hand. The aim of the pres-
ent research is to test the hypothesis that individuals’
expectation of being evaluated by grades negatively impacts
cooperative information sharing in group problem-solving
situations.
Controversial Effects of Grades
All Western citizens, with the exception of a few countries,
share the experience of receiving grades (OECD, 2011) –
be they numbers, letters, or other labels that easily allow
rank-ordering pupils and their products – right from the
beginning of their education in primary school and all
through their trajectory. It should be noted from the outset
that, in some cases, grades can be used to produce criterion-
referenced assessments and measure the degree to which
one fulfills the goals of a given task (Brookhart, 2004);
however the present research is limited to grades used to
produce normative, or norm-referenced assessments, that
is measuring people’s performance in relation to others,
an average or any other standard. Indeed, the latter is by
far the most widely used form of assessment in the Western
world (Ames, 1992; Knight & Yorke, 2003; Pope, 2003).
The practice of using grades was initially seen by edu-
cational scientists as extremely positive (Airasian, 1988):
Grades were found to be good predictors of achievement
tests and ideal tools for summative assessments, to the
extent that they allow a standardized measure of academic
achievement (both on the short and the long term), and can
also predict the results of some personality tests (De Ketele,
1993). The positive effects of grades come from their
potential to increase students’ visibility and motivation
(Cameron & Pierce, 2002). Indeed, expecting to be graded
means that one’s performance is identifiable by the person
assessing one’s work, which has been termed by various
authors ‘‘visibility of performance’’ (Marshall & Weinstein,
1984), ‘‘individual visibility’’ (Merton, 1968), or ‘‘visibility
of subjects’’ (Bond & Titus, 1983). Thus, in the present
work we will use the term ‘‘visibility’’ to refer to individual
visibility, that is, the visibility of one’s own performance.
At the same time, rewards and grades have been found
to alter students’ intrinsic motivation (Deci, Koestner, &
Ryan, 1999; Deci & Ryan, 1985), in particular through
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the reduction of perceived autonomy (Pulfrey, Darnon, &
Butera, 2013), to have negative effects on performance
and learning (Garbarino, 1975; Kohn, 1993), in particular
when comparing groups evaluated with grades to groups
evaluated with written comments (Butler & Nisan, 1986),
to impair cognitive processing (Meloth & Deering, 1992),
to reduce creativity (Amabile, 1983), and to amplify confir-
matory tendencies (Hayek, Toma, Oberlé, & Butera, 2014).
Grades were also found to trigger the adoption of perfor-
mance-avoidance goals, the need to avoid being outper-
formed by others (Pulfrey, Buchs, & Butera, 2011), which
are related to the propensity to fear social comparison
(Elliot & Murayama, 2008); indeed, grades make people’s
performance apparent within the group, by enhancing the
comparability of one’s work with that of others, a character-
istic that Thorndike called the ‘‘relativity’’ of grades
(Thorndike, 1913; see also Pulfrey et al., 2011). In sum,
grades appear to elicit both individual visibility and a
potentially threatening social comparison.
Effects of Grades on Cooperative
Information Sharing in Groups
What happens, then, when educators and managers want to
promote cooperation because of its potential for innovation
(Wong et al., 2009) and learning (Roseth, Johnson, &
Johnson, 2008), in a system that consistently and perva-
sively assesses group work with individual normative
grades? Grades elicit individual visibility, which in itself
should not impair cooperation. Indeed, research has shown
that individual visibility can yield positive effects on group
processes, such as reducing social loafing, the tendency
to avoid individual effort during group work (Latané,
Williams, & Harkins, 1979; Williams, Harkins, & Latané,
1981). However, grades are also involved in the processes
of academic and professional selection (Randall &
Engelhard, 2010), and therefore the use of grades in groups
could lead to competition and threatening social compari-
son. The ability of grades to generate both normative and
social standards of comparison for individuals might there-
fore interfere with cooperation, to the extent that grades
might motivate individuals to do well personally, instead
of cooperating for the sake of group work.
Thus, we expect a negative effect of grades on cooper-
ative behavior; in the present research, we study a specific
cooperative behavior, namely information sharing in groups
that is the sharing with others of information that has the
potential to benefit the whole group. This seems an
appropriate behavior for the present study, as many group
work situations require cooperation at the level of group
information sharing (e.g., the jigsaw task, Aronson, Blaney,
Stephan, Sikes, & Snapp, 1978; Johnson & Johnson, 2009),
and an effective way of ensuring that a group is cooperating
is precisely to check whether its members appropriately
exchange the information that is the most relevant for the
task (Greitemeyer & Schulz-Hardt, 2003; Schulz-Hardt,
Brodbeck, Mojzisch, Kerschreiter, & Frey, 2006).
However, the literature on group information sharing
suggests that individuals are often reluctant to share their
critical, most relevant information (e.g., Larson,
Christensen, Abbott, & Franz, 1996; Stasser & Stewart,
1992; Stasser & Titus, 2003). This effect is particularly
problematic in situations in which there is an asymmetric
distribution of information, as it often happens in working
groups, and group members need to pool their unshared
information (information possessed by only one member
at a time), as opposed to shared information (possessed
by all members), in order to find the optimal solution
(a situation that has been termed ‘‘hidden profile’’ in the lit-
erature on group decision making; cf. Stasser & Titus,
1985, 1987). Indeed, although hidden profiles imply posi-
tive interdependence of resources and necessarily require
cooperation to pool unshared information, the majority of
research suggests that members do not effectively pool their
unshared information (Lu, Yuan, & McLeod, 2012), an
effect also found with children (Gummerum, Leman, &
Hollins, 2013).
The use of grades in such interdependent situations
could lead members to face a mixture of cooperative incen-
tives to act in the interest of the group and share all avail-
able information, and competitive incentives to do well
personally and keep relevant information for themselves
(Davis, Laughlin, & Komorita, 1976; Wittenbaum,
Hollingshead, & Botero, 2004). In this respect, De Dreu,
Nijstad, and Van Knippenberg (2008) have suggested that
in mixed-motive situations there is a conflict between
collective and self-interests that negatively impact group
processes and information sharing. In mixed-motive situa-
tions, individuals either perceive their goals as positively
linked (cooperation) or as negatively linked to the goals
of their fellow members (competition). The Theory of
Cooperation and Competition (Deutsch, 1949) suggests that
cooperation leads to effective communication, while com-
petition impairs communication through the use of decep-
tive tactics and disinformation. In line with this idea,
studies with hidden profiles have shown that crucial,
unshared information was pooled to a lower extent under
competitive than under cooperative instructions, a differ-
ence that was not found on shared information (Toma &
Butera, 2009; Toma, Vasiljevic, Oberlé, & Butera, 2013).
Interestingly, the greater withholding of unshared informa-
tion in the competitive conditions appeared even if this was
at the cost of reducing the likelihood to find the correct
answer. Mistrust (or fear or being exploited) was found to
mediate the relation between competitive (vs. cooperative)
motives and unshared information pooling (Steinel & De
Dreu, 2004; Toma & Butera, 2009).
Other studies showed that individuals pursuing compet-
itive goals are less open to exchange task-relevant informa-
tion with others, but are more prone to exchange irrelevant
information while using others’ relevant information
(Poortvliet, Janssen, Van Yperen, & Van de Vliert, 2007,
Study 2). This is because competition activates a weak
reciprocity orientation and induces strong exploitative
behaviors (Poortvliet et al., 2007). Broadly speaking, by
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controlling the access to the most valuable information,
such as unshared information, members who expect to be
individually evaluated by grades might try to keep their
competitive advantage relative to others (French & Raven,
1959; Stroebe, Diehl, & Abakoumkin, 1992).
Overview of Experiments
We therefore hypothesized that in a hidden-profile prob-
lem-solving situation the expectation of individual grades,
as compared with no grades, should result in members
pooling less unshared information, but not necessarily less
shared information. We conducted two experiments to test
this hypothesis. In both experiments we used a cooperative
hidden profile task.
The aim of the first experiment was to test the negative
effects of grades on information sharing in groups. We used
a realistic manipulation of grades. As shown previously,
grades imply both increased individual visibility (i.e., mak-
ing one’s performance visible) and focus on social compar-
ison (i.e., making one’s performance comparable to that of
others). Therefore, the grades condition was contrasted with
two control conditions to account for two possible sources
of variation: One control condition in which grades were
not expected but individual performance was visible and
a second control condition in which grades were not
expected and individual performance was not visible. Our
hypothesis was that the exchange of unshared, but not
shared information, would be lower in the grades condition
compared to the two control conditions.
The aim of second experiment was mainly to replicate
the results obtained in Experiment 1 using the same task,
but controlling for the potential confounds in the manipula-
tion of grades. Precisely, in Experiment 2 we manipulated
the presence/absence of grades using a priming
procedure.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants
A total of 162 students (104 women and 57 men, one par-
ticipant did not mention her/his gender, M = 23.60 years,
SD = 4.01) from a large Swiss university were recruited
by email and paid 20 Swiss francs for their participation.
Participants were randomly assigned to 54 three-person
groups, whose discussions were videotaped. Twelve groups
were removed because of the bad quality of the recording;
the remaining 42 groups were distributed across different
experimental conditions as follow: 13 groups in the Non
Graded–Non Visible condition, 15 groups in the Non
Graded–Visible condition, and 14 groups in the Graded–
Visible condition.
Task
The task used was a problem-solving task concerning a
road accident structured as a hidden profile and adapted
from Toma and Butera (2009; see Appendix). Four persons
were potential suspects in this accident, but three of them
were exonerated (Mr. X, Mrs. Y, and Mr. Z) and the fourth
(Mr. X’s son) incriminated based on a critical set of 18
clues. The entire set of information contained 39 items:
21 shared and 18 critical unshared items. A hidden profile
was created by distributing six critical unshared items to
each of the group members. The 21 shared items described
the accident’s circumstances and suspects’ characteristics
(descriptive information). The 18 unshared items, if pooled
together, allow for the identification of Mr. X’s son as the
guilty person (identification information). This task is par-
ticularly suited to measure cooperative information sharing
among group members, because any neglect of unshared
information can be interpreted as intentional and motivated
behaviour. Indeed, task characteristics have been pretested
in several pilot experiments by Toma and Butera (2009),
which revealed that participants were able to discriminate
between shared and unshared information, and between
important and unimportant information; participants also
understand that pooling unshared information is needed to
solve the case.
Procedure
Upon their arrival in the laboratory, participants were told
that they were taking part in a study on ‘‘how people who
work in teams get to solve criminal cases.’’ The experimenter
explained that the study included twophases.During the first
phase, the participants were individually provided with the
case, and asked to identify the person responsible for the
car accident. They were each provided with 21 shared infor-
mation items and six unshared items, orienting each partici-
pant toward one specific suspect. They had a maximum of
3 min to individually derive whowas the person responsible
for the accident. During the second phase, participants were
asked to work as a team and to discuss the case in order to
identify the guilty person for no more than 15 min.
They were also informed that they did not have the same
information and that shared information items were pre-
sented in the first paragraph of the case description page,
while unshared information items in the second paragraph.
The groups were instructed to cooperate to reach a common
solution, write down their final solution once they decided,
and call the experimenter to end the session. After the intro-
ductory instructions, supplementary instructions depending
on the experimental conditions were given.
The most ecological manipulation of grades requires a
context of both individual visibility (because, as shown,
grades usually make one’s performance visible) and com-
parison (because, as also shown, grades usually make one’s
performance comparable to that of others). Thus, the grade
condition was contrasted with two control conditions, to
account for the two possible sources of variation.
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Groups in the Graded – Visible condition, the experi-
mental condition, were told that the teamwork was video-
taped, and that the experimenter was not only interested
in the group solution but also in each member’s individual
contribution. They were told that each contribution would
be graded on a scale ranging from 1 to 6, which corre-
sponds to the usual grading range in Switzerland:
‘‘Although I’m interested in your team product, I will
observe your work and at the end also give each one of
you a grade (from 1 to 6) as a function of each one’s con-
tribution to the investigation.’’
Groups in the Non Graded – Visible condition were told
that the teamwork was videotaped in order to ensure that
each group member contributed in finding the group solu-
tion. They were also told that the experimenter was only
interested in the group solution, and that the individual con-
tributions were not assessed.
Groups in the Non Graded – Non Visible condition were
told that the teamwork was not videotaped and that the
experimenter was only interested in the group solution.
We moreover pointed to the fact that cameras were not
turned ON which did not raise any questions as the cameras
did not display any external sign of recording process (i.e.,
no external red/green light showing).
All groups were instructed to call the experimenter
when the discussion ended. The experimenter then
explained the purpose and design of the study, and
requested consent to use the videos for research purposes;
all participants agreed. The entire experiment lasted about
45 min.
Dependent Measures: Information Pooling During
Group Discussions
Every group discussion was videotaped and fully tran-
scribed. Two independent coders, blind to the hypotheses
and to the type of information (unshared vs. shared), ana-
lyzed the transcriptions. Coders had been especially trained
in video coding: They were instructed to code the number
of times all information items were mentioned, which
included the unshared and shared information, but also
other information mentioned during the discussion. This
coding thus allowed having the full group discussions
coded. The inter-raters reliability was calculated by com-
puting for each item of information an intra-class coeffi-
cient (ICC) of absolute agreement in a mixed model
(McGraw & Wong, 1996). When an item had an ICC of
minimum value of .4 and a p-value < .05, the two scores
of the raters were combined into a mean. The disagree-
ments between raters were solved by discussion.
The intra-class correlation of the coded information items
had an estimated reliability varying between 0.44 and 1.1
The dependent measures were derived from the coded
group discussions. Participants had 39 items of information
available to solve the case: 21 shared and 18 unshared infor-
mation items, and we therefore computed two scores,
namely the proportion of unshared information and the pro-
portion of shared information. Why a proportional score,
instead of a simple count of the number of unshared and
shared information mentioned? In the seminal article that
started the line of research on hidden profiles, Stasser and
Titus (1985) outlined an ‘‘Information Sampling Model.’’
This model explains that in order to understand when and
why different pieces of information are discussed in a
group, it is crucial to consider the probability that each
piece of information is mentioned by members. This has
a very important consequence: Unshared and shared infor-
mation do not have the same likelihood of being discussed
(see also Stasser, Taylor, & Hanna, 1989). In the present
work, we wanted to study whether unshared and shared
information were differently pooled as a function of our
experimental manipulations, accounting for the different
likelihood of being discussed of unshared and shared infor-
mation. Thus, we have used a proportional index, just as in
previous work on hidden profiles (Scholten et al., 2007;
Toma & Butera, 2009).
However, we did not compute the proportions of
unshared and shared information by, respectively, dividing
the number of mentioned unshared items by the total num-
ber of unshared items available (18) and by dividing the
number of mentioned shared items by the total number of
shared items available (21). Indeed, because several studies
suggested that participants do not follow base rates
(Stasser & Stewart, 1992; Toma & Butera, 2009; Tversky
& Kahneman, 1974), we computed a measure that is closer
to the participants’ actual behavior. More specifically, we
computed (1) the proportion of unshared information by
dividing the number of mentioned unshared information
by the total amount of all items of information actually
mentioned, and (2) the proportion of shared information
by dividing the number of mentioned shared information
by the total amount of all items of information actually
mentioned during each group discussion, as Toma and
Butera (2009) did. It should be noted that, in order to
remain close to the participants’ actual behavior, which
may include irrelevant information, the denominator
contained every piece of information actually mentioned.
Indeed, we observed that participants used quite often
pieces of information that were not part of the materials,
such as for instance personal experience to confer legiti-
macy to one’s argument in favor of an unshared information
or in favor of one of the preferred profiles.
It is important to note that the two measures are inde-
pendent, given the above description of the denominator
of the proportional scores. The overall discussion time of
1 Although a correlation of one seems very unlikely to happen, it is nevertheless not surprising to have some measures with a perfect
correlation, for some of the items coded were not prone to subjective coding (e.g., concerning measures where coders had to count the
number of times where an unshared information was stated).
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each group was measured, and entered in the analysis
as a covariate.2
Results
Overview of Analyses
To test our hypothesis we set two orthogonal contrasts: C1,
the model contrast that describes our hypothesis (+1, +1,
2, corresponding respectively to the Non Graded – Non
Visible, Non Graded – Visible, and Graded – Visible con-
ditions), and C2, its orthogonal contrast (+1, 1, 0) corre-
sponding to the residual variance (Abelson & Prentice,
1997).
Preliminary linear regression analyses on the proportion
and the amount of pooled information includedGroups’sex-
ual composition (coded 1 for groups with a minority of
women and +1 for groups with a majority of women),
Discussion Time, as well as a marginal interaction between
Discussion Time and the C1 contrast. These analyses
revealed no effect of Groups’sexual composition, but amain
effect of Discussion Time and two interactions with our rel-
evant contrasts.3 Therefore, Discussion Time as well as its
interactions with the C1 and C2 contrasts were entered as
covariates (Yzerbyt, Muller, & Judd, 2004), while Groups’
sexual composition was dropped from the final model.
Proportion of Unshared Information
The model in which the proportion of unshared information
was regressed on the five predictors revealed a main effect
of the C1 contrast (+1, +1, 2), b = .02, SE = .006,
F(1, 36) = 9.94, p < .003, g2p = .22, showing that, as
predicted, groups in the Graded – Visible condition pooled
significantly less unshared information (M = 0.46;
SD = 0.05) than did groups in the Non Graded – Visible
condition (M = 0.51; SD = 0.08) and the Non Graded –
Non Visible condition (M = 0.53; SD = 0.07). The effect
of the residual contrast C2 was not significant, b = .01,
SE = .011, F(1, 36) = 1.49, p = .23.
Proportion of Shared Information
The model in which the proportion of shared information
was regressed on the five predictors revealed a main effect
of the C1 contrast (+1, +1, 2), b = .02, SE = .008,
F(1, 36) = 5.24, p < .03, g2p = 0.13, showing that the
amount of shared information pooled during discussion also
significantly differed between conditions. This time, groups
in the Graded – Visible condition pooled significantly more
shared information (M = 0.29; SD = 0.07) than groups in
the Non Graded – Visible (M = 0.24; SD = 0.09) and
Non Graded – Non Visible conditions (M = 0.22;
SD = 0.08). The effect of the residual contrast C2 was
not significant, b = .01, SE = .014, F(1, 36) = 0.97
p = .33. No other effect reached significance.4 The results
are presented in Figure 1.5
Discussion
The results revealed that information pooling was impacted
differently by the experimental manipulation depending on
whether this information was uniquely or jointly held by
the group members. More precisely, groups in the Graded
– Visible condition pooled a lower proportion of critical,
unshared information compared to groups in the two control
conditions. Interestingly, in the two control conditions,
where individual visibility was either not enhanced, or
enhanced but without the expectation of grades, groups
2 Discussion Time and its interaction with the two contrasts were added to the information pooling regression analysis. Indeed, one can
argue that the time spent by the groups to discuss and achieve the task is directly linked to the opportunity groups had to share a given
amount of information (the more time groups have spent to achieve the task, the longer the opportunity to share information).
3 Controlling for Discussion Time regarding the proportion of Unshared Information, a significant main effect of Discussion Time was
found, b = .001, SE = .001, F(1, 35) = 14.65, p < .001, g2p = 0.3. A marginal interaction between Discussion Time and C1 was also
found, b = 4.812E-5, SE = .001, F(1, 35) = 3.05, p < .09, g2p = 0.08. Therefore Discussion Time and its interactions with the contrasts
were kept in the model (Yzerbyt et al., 2004).
Controlling for Discussion Time regarding the proportion of Shared Information, a significant main effect of Discussion Time was found,
b = .001, SE = .001, F(1, 35) = 9.33, p < .004, g2p = 0.21. A marginal interaction between Discussion Time and the residual contrast
was found, b = .001, SE = .001, F(1, 35) = 3.87, p < .06, g2p = 0.1. Again, Discussion Time and its interactions with the contrasts were
kept in the model.
4 One might be interested in the sheer amount of unshared and shared information. We tested the same model on the number of unshared
pieces of information, and found that groups in the Graded – Visible condition mentioned significantly less unshared information
(M = 15.96; SD = 3.79) than did groups in the Non Graded – Visible condition (M = 17.70; SD = 1.93) and the Non Graded – Non
Visible condition (M = 17.50; SD = 2.19), b = .64, SE = .37, F(1, 36) = 5.47, p = .025, g2p = .08 (for the contrast C1). The effect of the
residual contrast C2 was not significant, b = .08, SE = .47, F < 1.
We also tested the same model on the number of shared pieces of information, and found that groups in the Graded – Visible condition
mentioned more shared information (M = 10.60; SD = 4.78) than groups in the Non Graded – Visible (M = 9.10; SD = 4.82) and Non
Graded – Non Visible conditions (M = 7.54; SD = 3.08), although this contrast did not reach the usual significance level, b = .58,
SE = .36, F(1, 36) = 2.65, p = .11 (for the contrast C1). The effect of the residual contrast C2 was not significant either, b = .91,
SE = .62, F(1, 36) = 2.16, p = .15. These analyses show that the pattern of results does not follow a different logic as compared with that
obtained on the proportional score, although the effects are significant for unshared information only.
5 Although our main interest was to study precisely the group information sharing process, it is common practice in the literature on hidden
profiles to report group performance. Therefore, the solutions provided by the groups (Mr. X, Mrs. Y, Mr. Z, or Mr. X’s son) were studied;
it appeared that 90.7% of the groups had found the correct answer (Mr. X’s son), regardless of condition, v2 (6, N = 54) = 8.65, p = .19.
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appeared to be willing to exchange the same proportion of
unshared information. This suggests that individual visibility
alone is not detrimental to group information sharing, unless
it is accompanied by the expectation of being graded.
Although the results of this experiment were in line with
our hypothesis, one could argue that the Graded – Visible
condition, although closely patterning most natural situa-
tions of grading, implied negative reward interdependence
between group members (Deutsch, 1979; Johnson,
Maruyama, Johnson, Nelson, & Skon, 1981; Kelley &
Thibaut, 1969). Moreover, this condition also introduced
two sources of individual visibility: One explicitly stated
by the experimenter and one more implicit, inherent to
the attribution of grades in a group (Monteil & Huguet,
1993). Thus, the Graded – Visible condition differed from
the others with regard to attribution of grades, enhanced
individual visibility and negative reward interdependence.
Experiment 2
We therefore conducted a second study to eliminate the
above confounds, using a more subtle manipulation of
grades with a priming procedure, and we hypothesized that
groups working in an explicitly cooperative setting will
pool less unshared information, but not necessarily less
shared information, when primed with grades than when
primed with a neutral concept (control condition).
Method
Participants
A total of 96 students enrolled in a large Swiss university
(54 women and 42 men,M = 21.78 years, SD = 3.34) with
different academic backgrounds volunteered in this study.
They were recruited mainly via email but also directly in
cafeterias and working areas. Participants were randomly
assigned to 32 three-person groups. Six groups were
removed from the analyses because of the poor quality of
the recording. Therefore the remaining 26 groups were dis-
tributed to different experimental conditions as follow: 14
groups primed with grades, and 12 primed with a neutral
concept.
Procedure
The task used in this second experiment was identical to
the one used in Experiment 1 except that grades were not
manipulated with instructions mentioning individual visi-
bility and individual grades. Rather, upon their arrival at
the laboratory, participants’ attention was drawn to a poster
hanging in one of the corners of the room. They were told
that the poster had been previously used for an introductory
training session devoted to new foreign teaching assistants,
and that they were not to pay attention to it. Two different
posters were presented depending on which experimental
condition groups were assigned to. The two posters had
exactly the same format (a vertical axis in the shape of
an arrow pointing to the top) with a description on its right,
but their content differed. In the Grades Prime condition the
poster was entitled ‘‘Grading and ranking students,’’ and the
description displayed grades used in the Swiss educational
system, ranging from (1) Poor, to (6) Excellent, and moving
from bottom to top (see Appendix). For each grade, the per-
centage of success it implied was mentioned. In the Neutral
Prime condition the poster was entitled ‘‘Getting to know
one’s work environment,’’ and the description displayed
the different organizational structures belonging to the uni-
versity campus, ranging from bottom, the common services
provided (student associations, university restaurant), to top,
the highest authorities (president of university), again in six
levels.
Groups in both conditions received the same experimen-
tal instructions as in Experiment 1 with regard to group
work and the task. They followed the same two-step proce-
dure: Individual work, then group work. This time the
experimenter announced at the beginning of the study that
the group work would be recorded, implying that in both
conditions individual performance would be visible; all par-
ticipants gave consent to use the videos for research pur-
poses. At the end of the session experimenter explained
the purpose and design of the study.
Dependent Measures
The same dependent measures as in Experiment 1 were
used, namely the proportion of unshared and shared
information. The intra-class correlation of the coded infor-
mation items had an estimated reliability varying between
0.71 and 1.
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Figure 1. Proportions of unshared and shared information
pooled as a function of experimental conditions (Exper-
iment 1).
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Results
Overview of Analyses
As in Experiment 1, Discussion Time6 was entered as a
covariate. The Experimental conditions variable was coded
(1) for the Neutral Prime condition and (+1) for the
Grades Prime condition. Preliminary analyses also included
Groups’ sexual composition, coded (1) for groups with a
minority of women and (+1) for groups with a majority of
women, but these analyses revealed no effect of Groups’
sexual composition on the proportion and the amount of
pooled information. Therefore the variable was not retained
in the model.
Proportion of Unshared Information
The linear regression model in which the proportion of
unshared information was regressed on the three predictors
revealed a main effect of the experimental conditions vari-
able, b = .03, SE = .014, F(1, 22) = 4.28, p < .05,
g2p = .16, showing that groups in the Grades Prime condi-
tion pooled significantly less unshared information
(M = 0.50; SD = 0.05) than did groups in the Neutral
Prime condition (M = 0.56; SD = 0.07).
Proportion of Shared Information
The model in which the proportion of shared information
was regressed on the three predictors revealed a main effect
of the experimental conditions variable, b = .04, SE = .015,
F(1, 22) = 5.76, p < .03, g2p = .21, showing that groups in
the Grades Prime condition pooled significantly more
shared information (M = 0.27; SD = 0.07) than groups
in the Neutral Prime condition (M = 0.18; SD = 0.06).7
The results are presented in Figure 2.8
Discussion
This second study provides supplementary evidence that in
a cooperative group situation grades interfere with group’s
cooperative behavior and negatively impact the pooling of
the most relevant information, namely unshared informa-
tion. In Experiment 1 it was difficult to disentangle whether
the effect observed on information sharing was due to the
presence of grades, or to the negative interdependence of
reward that the manipulation of grades implied. Therefore,
in Experiment 2 we rendered the two experimental condi-
tions comparable by proposing two cooperative twin-
conditions, set with the same positive resource and goal
interdependences and no negative interdependence of
rewards. Results found in this second study confirmed
our hypothesis showing that groups primed with grades
were less focused on the most relevant, unshared informa-
tion during the group discussion. At the same time, groups
primed with grades pooled more irrelevant, shared informa-
tion, than groups in the control condition.
General Discussion
The practice of using grades, whatever their form, has been
considered for many years as a positive feature of perfor-
mance assessment, because it was supposed to increase
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Figure 2. Proportions of unshared and shared information
pooled as a function of experimental conditions (Exper-
iment 2).
6 Preliminary analyses revealed that Discussion Time was not normally distributed; therefore it was entered in the model after a square root
transformation.
7 Again, we tested the same model on the number of unshared pieces of information, and found that groups in the Grades Prime condition
did not pool significantly less unshared information (M = 17.50; SD = 2.34) than did groups in the Neutral Prime condition (M = 17.16;
SD = 2.33), F < 1. However, groups in the Grades Prime condition pooled significantly more shared information (M = 9.78; SD = 3.74)
than did groups in the Neutral Prime condition (M = 5.62; SD = 2.32), F(1, 22) = 2.96, p = .05, g2p = .06. These analyses show that the
pattern of results does not follow a different logic as compared with that obtained on the proportional score, although the effects are
significant for shared information only.
8 Again, we studied group performance as a supplementary analysis, but the effect of our manipulation on group performance could not be
tested, since all groups, irrespective of the condition, found the correct solution. Although the focus of this research is on group
information sharing process, one might ask why in both experiments the vast majority of groups found the correct solution. In this respect,
it should be noted that in all conditions of both experiments participants worked with a cooperative group structure (positive
interdependence), a condition that in Toma and Butera (2009) resulted in increased pooling of unshared information and a higher level of
group performance. Accordingly, the present results showed that overall all participants pooled more unshared than shared information,
regardless of the conditions and therefore finding the correct solution was quite easy. In other words, in this task the overall neglect of
unshared information was not substantial enough to affect the final solution.
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workers’ and learners’ visibility and motivation (Cameron
& Pierce, 2002), and thereby facilitate achievement and
cooperation (De Ketele, 1993; Johnson & Johnson, 2002).
It is therefore common practice to use individual grading
even for tasks that need to be carried out cooperatively.
In the present research, we took the perspective of a differ-
ent line of research pointing out that individual grading for
cooperative tasks is particularly problematic, because it
creates mixed-motives situations in which people are in fact
required to act in the interest of the group and cooperate,
and at the same time to consider self-interest and compete
for good grades. We therefore hypothesized that the expec-
tation of being graded hampers the cooperative information
sharing behavior in group problem solving.
In two studies we tested the effects of grading on a
group cooperative behavior, namely on groups’ willingness
to share relevant, unshared information in hidden profiles.
In Experiment 1 results revealed that groups in the Graded
– Visible condition pooled a lower proportion of unshared
information, the really valuable information in this task,
and a higher proportion of shared information than groups
in the other two conditions. In Experiment 2 we conceptu-
ally replicated this effect using a priming manipulation of
grades: Group members primed with grades pooled a lower
proportion of their unshared information, and a higher pro-
portion of their shared information compared to group
members primed with neutral concepts.
The results of the two studies are complementary and
point to the negative effects of grades in cooperative set-
tings: When grades were present, group members
exchanged a lower proportion of useful, unshared informa-
tion and discussed a higher proportion of information that
the other group members already had. The first experiment
highlights that individual visibility in itself has not deleteri-
ous effects, and that it is the use of grades that hampers
cooperative group work. The second experiment confirms
our contention that grades are indeed responsible for group
members being less focused on the pooling of relevant
information, by showing that the mere priming of grades
produces similar effects to those obtained in Experiment 1
with actual expectation of grades.
This research has important theoretical and practical
implications. First, this research contributes to questioning
the theoretical perspective that grades are ideal tools for
summative assessments and more broadly, good normative
standards for evaluation (Butler & Nisan, 1986; Covington
& Omelich, 1984; Graham & Golan, 1991). At least as far
as cooperative work is concerned, the present research
shows that grading affects information sharing. This
research also contributes to showing the consequences of
the view that grades, by increasing students’ individual vis-
ibility, increase their motivation to perform well on tasks
(Cameron & Pierce, 2002). Indeed, in cooperative tasks,
the motivation to perform well may very well interfere with
the motivation to interact cooperatively. Our results, in
particular those of Experiment 1, revealed that while indi-
vidual visibility in itself was not found to impair informa-
tion sharing, individual visibility associated with grades
did. Taken together, the two studies point to the difficulty
to create cooperative group environments when normative
evaluative standards are used with the aim to assess individ-
uals’ contribution. It seems that a cooperative structure can
be easily damaged when group members expect to be
individually graded.
One might ask why grades negatively impact groups’
cooperative information sharing behaviors. Indeed, the lack
of any measure of perceived competition and cooperation
as potential mediators in the present research is a limitation
that calls for future studies, particularly in order to better
interpret the direction of the results presently obtained.
Although not tested in this research, one possibility is that
grades induce a threatening social comparison with the
other group members; the priming effect in Experiment 2
suggests indeed that grades may remind group members
of previous situations in which individual evaluation had
resulted in differential appreciation of people, as it often
happens for instance in school. By keeping useful, unshared
information for themselves and pooling useless, shared
information students might think that this behavior maxi-
mize their chances to be the one who discovers the correct
solution and, even though the task is cooperative, to receive
greater praise for this achievement. This suggests that the
normative component of grades can lead to strategic behav-
ior. In line with this idea, a study by Fischer, Kastenmüller,
Frey, and Peus (2009) showed that individuals facing a
threatening social comparison are more reluctant to trans-
mit high-quality information to their colleagues.
At the same time, the threatening social comparison
elicited by grades can also induce attentional deficits
(Muller & Butera, 2007) such as distracting individuals
from key elements of the task (e.g., unshared information)
while devoting more attentional resources to less useful
aspects (e.g., shared information). The difference in the pro-
portion of unshared and shared information obtained in
both experiments supports this explanation. Future research
should pit these motivational and attentional explanations
against each other when studying the effects of grades on
information sharing.
Second, this research also contributes to the recent trend
that has started considering groups as motivated informa-
tion processors (De Dreu et al., 2008; Toma, Vasiljevic,
Augustinova, Oberlé, & Butera, 2012). This literature sug-
gests that the conflict between collective and self-interests
generates mixed-motive that negatively impact group infor-
mation sharing (e.g., Wittenbaum et al., 2004). Some stud-
ies involving information pooling have shown, for example,
that in competitive situations less unshared information is
pooled than in cooperative situations, a difference that is
not found on shared information (Toma & Butera, 2009;
Toma et al., 2012). Other studies obtained similar results
when testing the impact of cooperative and competitive
individual traits on group decision processes (De Dreu,
Beersma, Stroebe, & Euwema, 2006). However, in previous
research mixed-motives were represented by the confronta-
tion of the positive resource interdependence elicited by the
hidden-profiles task and the negative goal interdependence
elicited by competition instructions; no study to date
directly used a mixed-motive situation combining positive
and negative goal interdependence. In the present research,
we created for the first time a group working context in
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which members are explicitly asked to cooperate – a con-
text of positive goal interdependence – while being individ-
ually evaluated by grades – a context that is most often one
of negative goal interdependence, as students have learned
in the course of their history of academic selection (Darnon,
Dompnier, Delmas, Pulfrey, & Butera, 2009). Therefore our
research adds to the previous literature on group informa-
tion sharing by showing that in a mixed-motives situation,
negative goal interdependence takes over positive goal
interdependence, with the result of reducing the sharing
of relevant information.
Finally, this research suggests that grades may represent
two dangers for actual working groups. The first is to inter-
fere with cooperation. Recent research in the area of
cooperative work, and cooperative learning in particular,
has shown that cooperation is a delicate structure, and that
any cue that might imply some form of threatening social
comparison disrupts the beneficial effects of cooperative
learning (e.g., Buchs, Butera, & Mugny, 2004; Buchs,
Gilles, Dutrévis, & Butera, 2011; Buchs, Pulfrey, Gabarrot,
& Butera, 2010). Grades might very well be one instance of
such cues. The second danger is to induce antisocial behav-
iors, even in settings with a clear cooperative structure.
Recent research has shown that self-enhancement values,
defined as the pursuit of individual interests, personal suc-
cess and power acquisition (Schwartz, 2006), predict cheat-
ing (Pulfrey & Butera, 2013). As the expectation of grades
may prioritize individual interests and personal success, it is
also possible that it induces cheating behaviors, even when
group members are encouraged to cooperate. With this in
mind, we can only recommend to avoid grading individuals
in cooperative groups.
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Appendix
Priming Material Used in Experiment 2
Figure A1. Poster for the grades prime condition.
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